Why Don\u27t You Join In? A Typology of Information System Certification Adopters by Lins, Sebastian et al.
Decision Sciences
Volume 0 Number 0
xxx 2020
© 2020 The Authors. Decision Sciences published by Wiley Periodicals
LLC on behalf of Decision Sciences Institute
Why Don’t You Join In? A Typology of
Information System Certification Adopters
Sebastian Lins† and Theresa Kromat
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management, Institute
of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods (AIFB), Research Group Critical
Information Infrastructures (cii), Kaiserstraße 89, Karlsruhe, 76133, Germany,
e-mail: sebastian.lins@kit.edu, theresa.kromat@kit.edu
Julian Löbbers and Alexander Benlian
Darmstadt University of Technology (TU Darmstadt), Department of Law and Economics,
Chair of Information Systems and Electronic Services, Hochschulstraße 1, Darmstadt, 64289,
Germany, e-mail: loebbers@ise.tu-darmstadt.de, benlian@ise.tu-darmstadt.de
Ali Sunyaev
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management, Institute
of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods (AIFB), Research Group Critical
Information Infrastructures (cii), Kaiserstraße 89, Karlsruhe, 76133, Germany,
e-mail: sunyaev@kit.edu
ABSTRACT
While the importance of information system (IS) certifications to demonstrate compli-
ance with security and personal data protection requirements is constantly increasing,
competing (theoretical) viewpoints exist that outline the rationales for organizations to
adopt certifications. The results of these competing perspectives are inconclusive re-
search findings in the certification adoption literature. While organizations may use cer-
tifications to signal quality to consumers, others mainly adopt certifications to improve
internal processes or create institutional legitimacy. To enhance our understanding of the
motivation for online vendors to adopt IS certifications, we conduct a literature review
and a ranking-type Delphi study with two unique panels comprising certified online
vendors (N = 15) and certification authorities (N = 24). As a result, we provide a rank-
order list of 24 motivators and 17 demotivators impacting online vendors’ intentions to
adopt IS certifications. We reveal that certain motives are context-independent, whereas
other motives are specific for electronic markets (e.g., “signal data protection”). We also
provide rich descriptions of potential demotivators, thereby increasing our understand-
ing of the boundary conditions for IS certification adoption. Comparing our findings to
three competing theoretical perspectives enabled us to derive a typology of distinctive
certification adopters: functionalists, institutionalists, and signalers. In developing this
typology, our findings constitute a first step toward alleviating the inconclusive find-
ings in the academic literature as well as highlighting differences in motivating and
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inhibiting factors that impact vendors’ adoption intentions. [Submitted: July 24, 2019.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, online vendors have developed multiple strategies to
reduce consumers’ uncertainty surrounding system usage and to mitigate related
risks in electronic markets. These strategies include, among others, a way of pro-
viding consumers with guarantees of a system’s qualities, embedding and exposing
consumer reviews of such qualities, or developing trustworthy brands (Özpolat,
Gao, Jank, & Viswanathan, 2013; Mavlanova, Benbunan-Fich, & Lang, 2016).
Another common strategy is to use information system (IS) certifications that
represent neutral third-party attestations about systems and related management
operations. Such attestations verify the conformity of system features and oper-
ations to prespecified certification requirements (Lansing, Benlian, & Sunyaev,
2018). The variety of IS certifications has increased over time as systems have
diversified and risks in electronic markets have increased (Lins, Schneider, & Sun-
yaev, 2018). Well-known IS certifications currently include “Certified Privacy”
for Web shops, “CSA STAR” for cloud services, or “ISO/IEC 27001” for man-
agement standards for security. Similarly, the recent EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) has claimed that novel data protection certifications will serve
as the primary means of signaling compliance with the requirements of GDPR.
Online vendors are likely to benefit from presenting well-established IS cer-
tifications on their website or system interface. Certifications increase consumers’
trust in a vendor because they provide consumers with immediate assurance infor-
mation relevant for their system use, including assurances of system security (e.g.,
absence of malicious programs/malware) and privacy (e.g., appropriate usage of
personal data), as well as the integrity of management operations (e.g., reliable sys-
tem administration; Kim, Steinfield, & Lai, 2008; Hu, Wu, Wu, & Zhang, 2010).
Consequently, it appears reasonable that online vendors would adopt IS certifica-
tions to achieve such benefits. However, there are three competing theoretical view-
points for why organizations may adopt certifications, namely, the resource-based
view, institutional theory, and signaling theory, because adopting certifications is
voluntary and not legally required. While some organizations use certifications
to signal quality to consumers, others mainly adopt certifications to improve
internal processes or to create institutional legitimacy (Gopal & Gao, 2009; Heras-
Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). For example, organizations adopt the ISO 9001
quality management certification to realize internal benefits, such as product im-
provement and cost minimization (Djofack & Camacho, 2017), whereas other or-
ganizations are more driven by competitive pressure (Beck &Walgenbach, 2005).
Given these inconsistent views, it remains unclear whatmotivates online vendors to
adopt IS certifications. Without a deeper understanding of the rationale for IS certi-
fication adoption, certification initiatives are prone to be rejected by online vendors.
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Moreover, online vendors may adopt certifications that are detached from their ac-
tual motivations, resulting in false communication to their consumers. In addition,
prior research has mainly studied the causes motivating organizations to adopt cer-
tifications but has neglected to control for demotivators that prevent organizations
from seeking a certification, such as its high cost (e.g., Quazi, Khoo, Tan, &Wong,
2001). To enhance our understanding of the motivating and inhibiting factors for
online vendors to adopt IS certifications, we analyze online vendors’ intentions
to adopt IS certifications in electronic markets using three competing theoretical
viewpoints. In doing so, we strive to answer the following research question (RQ):
RQ:What motivates and demotivates online vendors to adopt IS certifications?
We applied a two-step research approach to answer this research question.
First, we conducted a literature review to reveal and better understand prevalent in-
conclusive research findings stemming from three competing theoretical perspec-
tives. Second, we performed a Delphi study comprising an online vendor and cer-
tification authority panel to pursue three goals: (1) to empirically validate whether
motivators and demotivators derived from various literature streams are applica-
ble and relevant in electronic markets; (2) to identify and describe further moti-
vators and demotivators that might be specific for electronic markets; and (3) to
rank identified motivators and demotivators to increase our understanding of their
relative importance in electronic markets. The complementary features of the lit-
erature review and the two-panel Delphi study allowed us to provide a comprehen-
sive ranked-order list of 24 motivators (e.g., “Increase Consumers’ Trust”) and 17
demotivators (e.g., “Restricted Flexibility”) impacting online vendors’ intentions
to adopt IS certifications. Reflecting our findings in light of the three competing
theoretical perspectives enabled us to derive a typology of certification adopters
comprising functionalists, institutionalists, and signalers.
Our study has several implications for research and practice. By synthesiz-
ing the existing literature and conducting a Delphi study, we not only validate 16
motives discussed in prior research but also identify 21 novel motives that have not
been discussed before. We also reveal that certain motives are context-independent
(e.g., “increase in sales and profit”), whereas other motives are specific for elec-
tronic markets (e.g., “signal data protection”). Unlike prior research on certifica-
tions, which is mainly centered around the motivating factors for adopting these
certifications, we harness certification authorities’ knowledge to gather more de-
tailed information on potential demotivators. We thereby increase our understand-
ing of the boundary conditions for IS certification adoption, in particular, the cir-
cumstances under which vendors will struggle to adopt IS certifications. Finally,
we provide a more nuanced analysis of certification adoption using the resource-
based view, institutional theory, and signaling theory than has been seen in the lit-
erature to date. Specifically, because these theories provide strikingly different pre-
dictions of certification adoption, we explore these differences in greater detail to
advance the current literature by deriving a typology of certification adopters with
a thorough discussion of motivators and opposing demotivators. Thus, our study is
also a first step toward resolving the inconclusive findings in the academic literature
regarding motives for certification adoption by differentiating certain motives and
making sense of particular adopter types and their respective adoption rationales.
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Figure 1: Example IS certifications and their respective seals for electronic mar-
kets.
RESEARCH BACKGROUND
IS Certifications in Electronic Markets
A common strategy to reduce consumers’ uncertainty about security, privacy, and
reliability and to signal trustworthiness is the adoption of IS certifications, which
is particularly important for small and medium-sized online vendors (Sunyaev &
Schneider, 2013; Mavlanova et al., 2016). An IS certification is defined as a volun-
tary assessment of an online vendor’s IS and related management processes per-
formed by an independent third party based on requirement catalogs, standards, or
regulations (Lansing et al., 2018). Upon successful completion of the certification
process, online vendors are permitted to display an assurance seal as a graphical
representation of the IS certification on their Web sites or system interfaces.
While a wide variety of IS certifications have already been proposed in elec-
tronic markets (see examples in Figure 1), one can generally differentiate three
types of IS certifications addressing (1) privacy, (2) security, and (3) business-
integrity concerns of consumers (Hu et al., 2010). First, certifications addressing
consumers’ privacy concerns are used to alleviate consumers’ perceived risks in
terms of, for example, inappropriate usage of personal data. Second, certifications
addressing consumers’ security concerns (e.g., unauthorized access, malicious pro-
grams, or malware) are used to reassure consumers that an online vendor uses, for
example, intrusion detection software, firewalls, or antivirus and anti-spyware. Fi-
nally, certifications addressing business integrity concerns guarantee fair business
practices and integrity of related systemmanagement operations (e.g., reliable sys-
tem administration).
Inconsistent Research on Vendors’ Intentions to Adopt Certifications
Related research on IS certifications and web seals has been constantly increasing
in recent decades and can be divided into three major streams (Table 1): (1)
developing, designing, and innovating certifications and underlying attestation
processes; (2) analyzing certifications’ impact on consumers; or (3) understand-
ing vendors’ rationales for adopting certifications and materializing anticipated
benefits. First, various scholars have examined the development of trustworthy
certifications (e.g., for cloud services; Lynn, van der Werff, Hunt, & Healy, 2016),
the structural elements of certifications (Lansing et al., 2018), and the increase
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Table 1: Literature streams on IS certifications (gray-filled cells indicate this
study’s focus).
Research
subject Research focus Example research avenues







• Communicating content of a cloud trust label to
signal trustworthiness (Lynn et al., 2016)
• Structural elements of IS certifications impact
consumer perceptions (Lansing et al., 2018)
• Design guidelines to automate the attestation












• Educational intervention influences the
awareness and perceived importance of
assurance seal services (Kim et al., 2008)
• Consumers’ cultural characteristics impact the
effectiveness of web assurance seal services (D.
J. Kim, Yim, Sugumaran, & Rao, 2016)
• Presence of the assurance seal increases the
likelihood of purchase conversion (Özpolat










• Analyzing certification diffusion processes,
motivations, and benefits of adoption
(Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013)
• More cost-effective firms and export-oriented
firms are more likely to seek out and acquire
certification (Gopal & Gao, 2009)
• Motivators and demotivators impacting
online vendors to adopt IS certifications (this
study)
of certification reliability by performing continuous compliance attestations (Lins
et al., 2018; Lins, Schneider, Szefer, Ibraheem, & Ali, 2019), among others.
Second, research taking a consumer perspective seeks to explain how IS certifi-
cations affect consumers, why these effects occur and how to predict the effect of
certifications on consumers (e.g., Kim et al., 2008; Kim & Kim, 2011; Lansing,
Siegfried, Sunyaev, & Benlian, 2019; Löbbers, & Benlian, 2019). Consumer-
related studies have primarily focused on three effects of IS certifications, namely,
increasing consumers’ trust perceptions, purchase intentions, and perceived as-
surance (Löbbers, Lins, Kromat, Benlian, & Sunyaev, 2020). Finally, research
taking a vendor perspective—which this study aims to contribute to—analyzes
the motivations of organizations to adopt certifications and whether organizations
can utilize the benefits of adoption, such as improved performance or increased
sales (e.g., Naveh & Marcus, 2004; Djofack & Camacho, 2017).
At present, researchers have not reached a clear consensus on the
main driving forces behind the adoption of certifications (Prajogo, 2011;
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(Martínez-Costa et al., 2008)
• Dominant top management or
employees (Beck &
Walgenbach, 2005)
• Realize the company’s strategy







• Match competitors’ actions
(Djofack & Camacho, 2017)
• Meet consumer demands
(Llopis & José Tarí, 2003)
• Comply with government
policies or regulations










• Increase in sales and profit
(Gopal & Gao, 2009)
• Use certifications as marketing
tool (Sampaio et al., 2010)
Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Djofack & Camacho, 2017). However,
there is an agreement to group those motivations into external and internal driving
forces (Table 2). Internal driving forces refer to when certifications are adopted
autonomously and organizations benefit through their implementation, such as
minimization of costs associated with improved internal efficiency. On the other
hand, external driving forces refer to the implementation of the certification in
response to certain external pressures (e.g., from competitors, consumers, or the
government) or incentives, such as perception enhancement of the organization
(e.g., image improvements). The classification of internal and external factors
originates from three different theoretical perspectives that are commonly used
to understand certification adoption motivation (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral,
2013; Lansing et al., 2018), namely, the “resource-based view” (Barney, 1991) to
understand internal factors and “institutional theory” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
and “signaling theory” (Spence, 1973) to explain external factors.
The “resource-based view” grounds organizational success in the resources
and capabilities that are controlled by the organization and may become a source
of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). Prior certification research
taking this perspective argues that organizations can mature in their implementa-
tion of, for example, the ISO 9001 quality management certification by taking the
best practices contained in the certification and making changes in organizational
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quality practices (e.g., Martínez-Costa, Martínez-Lorente, & Choi, 2008). In
contrast, a key argument in “institutional theory” is that organizations adopt
institutionalized structural elements, such as IS certifications, to ensure their
survival rather than to improve performance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Beck
& Walgenbach, 2005). Finally, “signaling theory” is fundamentally concerned
with reducing information asymmetries between two or more parties (i.e., the
consumer and online vendor) by sending signals to intentionally communicate the
imperceptible qualities of a signaler (Spence, 1973). Prior certification research
taking a signaling perspective proposes that certifications may act as a market
signal of superior quality and thereby, for instance, increase sales (e.g., Terlaak &
King, 2006; Gopal & Gao, 2009).
Given these competing theoretical perspectives, prior research has debated
whether the motives of certification adoption are more internally or externally
driven (Djofack &Camacho, 2017). For example, the institutional theory approach
has been criticized on the basis that organizations are dynamic and evolving, and
therefore, they can respond in different ways, according to their internal resources
and capacities (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). Additionally, it remains un-
clear whether these motives are applicable in electronic markets because extant
research analyzes only certifications that are based on ISO standards, such as ISO
9001 for quality and ISO 14001 for environmental management systems (Heras-
Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). In contrast to ISO standards, IS certifications are
regarded as a bundle of signals, comprising diverse assurances, such as security,
privacy, availability, consumer-friendliness of contracts, and legal compliance, rel-
evant for electronic markets (Lansing et al., 2019). Finally, only a few studies have
sought answers to the question of what hinders companies from adopting certifica-
tions (e.g., Kammoun & Aouni, 2013). Understanding such demotivators provides
deeper insights into the circumstances under which certain theoretical assumptions
might apply.
RESEARCH APPROACH
We apply a two-step research approach. First, we conduct a literature review to bet-
ter understand and resolve prevalent inconclusive research findings stemming from
the three competing theoretical perspectives. Second, we perform a Delphi study
to empirically validate whether the findings of the literature review are applicable
and relevant in electronic markets.
Literature Review
Our descriptive literature review was comprehensively guided by recommenda-
tions from IS research (e.g., Webster & Watson, 2002; Vom Brocke et al., 2015).
For the identification of studies addressing certifications in various literature
streams, we searched scientific databases that we deemed representative, as they
cover awide range of journal articles as well as conference articles from IS research
and the social sciences (i.e., marketing and psychology). We applied a keyword
search that resulted in 694 potentially relevant articles. After filtering for relevant
articles, we performed a forward and backward search to ensure that the seminal
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Figure 2: Illustration of the literature selection process.
articles were included in our literature set. Figure 2 illustrates our literature selec-
tion process, which resulted in 60 relevant articles that were subsequently coded
by adapting the process of Lacity, Khan, andWillcocks (2009). The literature anal-
ysis process resulted in a list of 13 motivators and seven demotivators. The online
supplementary material provides the details of our literature selection and analysis
processes as well as a concept matrix summarizing the coding for each article.
Delphi Study
While our literature review revealedmotivators and demotivators from diverse con-
texts (e.g., environmental certification and tourismmarketing), we aimed to empir-
ically validate that these motivators and demotivators are applicable and relevant to
electronic markets. For this purpose, we performed a Delphi study comprising two
unique panels, one that includes certified online vendors and another that includes
certification authorities. We followed the Delphi procedure outlined by Schmidt
(1997) to brainstorm, select, and rank online vendors’ motivators and demotiva-
tors when adopting IS certifications. The online supplementary material provides
further details on the Delphi process.
Panel selection
We invited online vendors and certification authority experts to participate in our
Delphi study because the Delphi approach as a group decision mechanism requires
qualified individuals with a good understanding of the topic of interest (Okoli &
Pawlowski, 2004). In particular, we invited small- and medium-sized online ven-
dors because they heavily depend upon IS certifications, as these certifications can
help them mitigate consumers’ concerns (e.g., consumers worry whether personal
data are handled correctly; Özpolat et al., 2013; Mavlanova et al., 2016). In ad-
dition, we reached out to certification authority professionals involved in IS certi-
fications’ issuance and attestation processes. Certification authorities also advise
online vendors in weighting IS certifications’ intended benefits and costs; hence,
further insights into the decision-making process of both certified and noncertified
online vendors can be gained by including certification authority experts in our
study.
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Although there is no consensus among researchers regarding the panel size
for Delphi studies, Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) recommended a group of 10–18
experts. We aimed at a minimum of 15 responses in our Delphi study and thus tar-
geted an initial expert panel of approximately 20 members to account for dropouts
during the study. Initially, we invited 47 panelists (21 for the online vendor panel
and 26 for the certification authority panel), of which 15 (for the online vendor
panel) and 24 (for the certification authority panel) accepted our invitations, a num-
ber that is consistent with other Delphi studies in IS research (e.g., Singh, Keil, &
Kasi, 2009). The demographic data are summarized in Table 3.
Data collection and analysis methods
Brainstorming phase. The first phase involved brainstorming to compare the pan-
elists’ responses with our prior literature review findings and to extend our list
of motivators and demotivators. We presented the panelists with an online survey
comprising a brief overview of the whole Delphi process as well as information
about the purpose of the current brainstorming phase. Following this introduction,
we asked the panelists to independently name and describe at least three (up to 10)
reasons explaining what motivates organizations to adopt IS certifications to iden-
tify motivators and what hinders organizations from adopting IS certifications to
identify demotivators. By the end of the brainstorming phase, the 15 online vendors
had provided a list of 45 motivators and 29 demotivators, whereas the 24 certifi-
cation authorities had provided a list of 32 motivators and 28 demotivators. Each
panelist provided between three and eight motivators as well as between three and
four demotivators.
Two authors aggregated and grouped identical answers and similar ones
through content analysis. In particular, we open-coded motivators and demotiva-
tors by analyzing the responses of our panelists. For each motivator, we coded a
name and description. If a newmotivator fit with an existingmotivator, we assigned
it accordingly; otherwise, a new motivator was created. We tried to use the same
motivators for both the online vendor and certification authority panels. If ambigu-
ities occurred regarding the exclusive assignment of a new motivator to an existing
motivator, the two researchers assigned the new motivator to an existing motiva-
tor according to the best of their knowledge. The same approach was applied to
the demotivators. The aggregation process resulted in a list of 20 motivators and
16 demotivators. Following Schmidt (1997), we circulated the consolidated list to
all the panelists, sought their feedback, and revised our mapping of the motivators
and demotivators accordingly. Obtaining the consolidation approved by the pan-
elists is an essential step in any Delphi study because otherwise one cannot be sure
that the panelists’ thoughts have been adequately captured and represented (Paré,
Cameron, Poba-Nzaou, & Templier, 2013). We received feedback from one pan-
elist, which led to an adjustment of our consolidated list in the form of mapping
one response to a new motivator, namely, “Signal Integrity.” All the remaining
panelists confirmed our aggregation. We then consolidated our findings by match-
ing the literature review results to the data from our Delphi brainstorming phase
to evaluate the applicability and relevance of the literature findings in electronic
markets throughout the upcoming phases. The literature review and the Delphi
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Table 3: Demographic data for the online vendor and certification authority pan-
els.
Characteristic Online vendor panel (n = 15)
Certification authority panel
(n = 24)
Age, years Mean: 44.15 [min.: 23; max.:
66]




73% male, 20% female, 7% no
answer





A-Levels (degree): 7%; Degree
from University of Applied










training: 4%; Other: 8%; No
answer: 13%
Work experience Mean: 19.63 years [min.: 2;
max.: 35]
Mean: 18.31 years [min.: 1;
max.: 45]
Organization size number of employees < 10:
66.67%; 10 – 49: 26.67%;
50 – 150: 0%; 151 – 250:
6.67%; > 250: 0%
number of employees < 10:
12.50%; 10 – 49: 33.33%;
50 – 150: 16.67%; 151 –
250: 8.33%; > 250: 20.83%;
No answer: 8.33%
Products offered Cars & Bicycles: 7%; Clothes:
13%; Computer &
Electronics: 13%;
Cosmetics: 7%; Food: 13%;






Mean: 1.27 [min.: 1; max.: 3]




(IPS): 20%; Other (e.g., ISO
certifications): 13%
Mean: 1.5 [min.: 0; max.: 4]
Trusted Shops: 21%; TÜV
SÜD Safer Shopping: 13%;
EHI-certified shops: 54%;
Internet Privacy Standards
(IPS): 8%; ISO/IEC 27001:






Mean: 4.27 [min.: 1; max.: 6]
Selection of IS certifications:
80%; Selection of a
certification authority: 67%;
Registration, application:





Mean: 4.54 [min.: 1; max.: 6]
Advisory and initiation: 88%;
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brainstorming phase together resulted in a consolidated set of 24 motivators and
17 demotivators.
Furthermore, we applied theoretical coding to classify the motivators and
demotivators under common themes. Theoretical coding enables us to create hier-
archical classifications that allow us to move beyond mere description to a more
abstract level of conceptualization. In particular, we reflected the identified moti-
vators and demotivators based on the theoretical principles of the “resource-based
view,” “institutional theory,” and “signaling theory” that have been commonly ap-
plied by prior research (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Lansing et al., 2018).
For example, the brainstorming phase reveals that online vendors are motivated to
adopt certifications for “Signal Integrity” and “Signal Data Protection.” Reflecting
these findings from a signaling theory perspective shows that online vendors use
certifications to signal information about the unobservable characteristics and ac-
tions of themselves (i.e., hidden information and action). We, therefore, grouped
these motivators into the theoretical category “convey hidden information and hid-
den actions.” By comparing our findings with these theoretical perspectives, we
identified three types of certification adopters, namely, “functionalists,” “institu-
tionalists,” and “signalers.”
Selection phase. In the selection phase, we narrowed the consolidated list
into a more manageable set for the ranking phase. Following the suggestions pro-
vided by Schmidt (1997), we separated the panels into online vendors and certifi-
cation authorities. Then, we independently presented the consolidated set of moti-
vators and demotivators to each panel in a random order and asked each panelist to
select (not rank) his or her top 10 motivators and demotivators to adopt IS certifi-
cations. Only 34 panelists (15 of the online vendor panel and 19 of the certification
authority panel) participated in this selection phase. We then reviewed this selec-
tion of the top ten motivators and demotivators from each respondent and retained
only those motivators and demotivators selected by the vast majority of the panel.
Again, the extant literature does not provide any definite cutoff value but instead
uses diverse thresholds ranging from as low as 30% (e.g., Piccinini, Hanelt, Gre-
gory, & Kolbe, 2015) to as high as 70% (e.g., Singh et al., 2009). We experimented
with different cutoff values (i.e., 40%, 45%, and 50%), with a cutoff value of 45%
producing the most promising results. To this end, we chose a cut-off value of 45%
for both panels, as this allowed us to include, for example, “ensure legal confor-
mity,” which we considered to be a specific motivator for electronic markets. A set
of ninemotivators and 10 demotivators that were chosen by the online vendor panel
as well as another set of eight motivators and 11 demotivators that were chosen by
the certification authority panel were used in the next phase. Because we deemed
this a usable number of motivators and demotivators to be ranked (i.e., not too
many motivators or demotivators), we did not perform a second selection phase.
Ranking phase. We asked each panel independently to review the list and
rank the items in order of priority (separately for both motivators and demotiva-
tors) and to provide a short explanation for their ranking of the items. We pre-
sented the selected motivators and demotivators in a random order and provided
information on howmany panelists selected a motivator or demotivator. Following
Schmidt (1997), we used Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) to measure the
degree of consensus among the panelists. Moreover, we used the Friedman test to
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calculate the mean rank for each item (Friedman, 1937). Of the 15 panelists of the
online vendor panel, only 14 panelists participated in the first round of ranking,
yielding a Kendall’s W of 0.24 (N = 14; χ2 = 26.933; p < .001) for the motiva-
tors and 0.201 (N = 14; χ2 = 25.309; p = .003) for the demotivators, suggesting
a weak level of consensus among the panelists. Of the initial 24 panelists of the
certification authority panel, only 11 panelists completed round one of the rank-
ing phases, reaching a Kendall’s W of 0.193 (N = 11; χ2 = 14.879; p = .038)
for the motivators and 0.26 (N = 11; χ2 = 28.545; p < .001) for the demotiva-
tors, suggesting a weak level of consensus among these panelists as well. Against
this background, we decided to conduct a second round of ranking. In the second
round, six online vendors participated, yielding a Kendall’s W of 0.756 (N = 6; χ2
= 36.311; p = .01) for the motivators and 0.327 (N = 6; χ2 = 17.636; p = .040)
for the demotivators. On the one hand, this result suggested that a strong level of
consensus had been reached among the motivators and, on the other hand, this re-
sult suggested that there was still little consensus among the demotivators. Only
five certification authority experts participated in round two of the ranking phase,
yielding a Kendall’s W of 0.659 (N = 5; χ2 = 23.067; p= .002) for the motivators
and 0.574 (N = 5; χ2 = 28.691; p < .001) for the demotivators. These ratios sug-
gested that, in both cases, a moderate level of consensus had been reached. At this
stage, we discussed whether we should conduct another round of ranking to obtain
a greater level of panel consensus. In making such decisions, the trade-off between
the feasibility (i.e., the indulgence of the panelists, the researcher’s resources, and
the additional time required) and the potential gain must be evaluated (Schmidt,
1997). We felt that some fatigue had set in among our panel members (as reflected
in the increased number of dropouts in both panels across this whole Delphi study).
Since we had fulfilled one of the stopping rules suggested by Schmidt (1997) in
the second round, we decided against a third round of ranking.
TYPOLOGY OF CERTIFICATION ADOPTERS
Functionalists
Adopters are considered functionalists when they adopt IS certifications in an au-
tonomous way to leverage and implement IS certifications as an organizational
resource to achieve organizational benefits (Table 4). In line with the resource-
based view, either functionalists lack internal capabilities or strive for continuous
improvement and therefore “internalize the certification’s best practices” and “ac-
cess certification authorities’ expert knowledge.” In doing so, functionalists aim to
“achieve benefits from thorough internalization,” such as cost savings or compet-
itive advantages.
Internalize certifications’ best practices
Online vendors taking a functionalist role adopt IS certifications to internalize
the structured approach and best practices contained in certifications and to make
use of attestation results for internal improvements. Internalization refers to the
process of absorbing both tacit and explicit information into the organization
and translating it into knowledge, which is then applied with a purpose (Knight
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Table 4: Objectives of functionalists and related motivators and demotivators.





Vendors internalize the best
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& Liesch, 2002). In this regard, certifications provide guidelines that must be
internalized into the organizations’ internal operations and used as daily practices
(Naveh & Marcus, 2004). Our findings support this resource-based view, given
that vendors adopt IS certifications for “Quality and Productivity Improvements,”
such as increasing the efficiency and quality of internal processes (Sampaio,
Saraiva, & Guimarães Rodrigues, 2010: “Checking and optimizing the ordering
processes” [online vendor]). Two specific areas of quality improvements were
noted by the panelists: “Increasing IT Security” and “Ensuring Legal Conformity.”
Regarding the former, the security of the IT infrastructure underlying an online
vendor’s business is assessed as part of a certification process. Identified security
issues and vulnerabilities can be resolved by online vendors (where necessary):
“Certification also has the advantage that the certified company sometimes knows
after the examination what it could improve itself, for example, concerning secu-
rity measures” [online vendor]. Regarding the latter, the IS certification process
provides support for improving the conformity regarding the legal requirements an
online vendor’s business faces, particularly by reviewing online vendors’ general
terms and conditions as well as related legal texts. In doing so, IS certifications
can note weaknesses in compliance with legal matters.
However, functionalists fear “Restricted Flexibility” when internalizing cer-
tifications because they have to adjust individual processes to meet best practices
and standards (Kammoun & Aouni, 2013). “The certification requirements, which
must be implemented, can restrict the scope of the day-to-day business as well as
the flexibility of the employees” [certification authority]. A restriction in flexibility
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may therefore hamper online vendors from making use of strategic resources,
such as assets, capabilities, and organizational processes, that lead to competitive
advantages (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). Finally, some online vendors may not
even attempt to adopt IS certifications because they are afraid of not being able to
internalize the certification requirements: “Legal requirements, such as the right
of revocation, which are required for completing the certification, are difficult
to implement” [certification authority]. We refer to this demotivator as “Fear of
Failure,” which results from challenging certification requirements.
Gain access to experts
Functionalists also adopt IS certifications to “Gain Access to Experts”: “The com-
pany wants to improve its processes/services through the (specialist) expertise of
the certifier. In addition to possible certification results, […], there are often also
optional optimization hints and recommendations from the auditors” [certification
authority]. The resource-based view provides the rationale that online vendors are
concerned not only with the deployment and exploitation of existing strategic re-
sources but also with the investment and augmentation of resources to buttress
and extend positions of competitive advantage (Grant, 1991). This strategy is of-
ten referred to as “filling resource gaps” and may lead to the external adoption of
complementary resources. Certification authorities’ profound knowledge and ex-
perience in online vendors’ businesses and technological and organizational safe-
guards (Lansing et al., 2018) can thus be viewed as complementary resources that
can be leveraged to improve existing resources: “Through the view from the out-
side, problems may be pointed out which one does not perceive in the daily work
by oneself” [certification authority].
In contrast, relying on (external) certifications also has drawbacks. First, on-
line vendors place themselves in a position where they are “Depending on a Certifi-
cationAuthority”: “Shop owners do not want to be dependent on the seal provider”
[online vendor]. Certification authorities might not only deter or punish inappro-
priate behavior by the online vendor, such as imposing financial penalties, they also
may have control over the advancement of proprietary certification schemes and
therefore have an (indirect) impact on organizational routines that are intended to
be internalized by online vendors. Second, one panelist also raised “Data Confiden-
tiality Concerns” when disclosing internal information during the certification at-
testation.While a certification attestation covers, among other things, assessing the
system documentation about its security and data protection measures, interview-
ing online vendor employees, or conducting on-site assessments (Lansing et al.,
2018), certification authorities gain deep insights into online vendors’ operations
and their sources of competitive advantages, which can be misused by malicious
employees of the certification authority.
Achieve benefits from thorough internalization
Taking recourse to the resource-based view, a certification internalization process
will produce a set of routines and procedures (tacit and explicit) for internal
operations, which function as a unique factor that cannot be easily imitated by
other organizations (Prajogo, 2011). This inimitability is translated into improved
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performance and, consequently, a competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Hence, certifications help organizations build their unique internal operational
capabilities, which may produce variability in performance against their com-
petitors in the market, while the certification and its underlying standard are not
unique (Prajogo, 2011). Both prior research and the panelists emphasize that
online vendors may increase their market competitiveness by internalizing IS
certifications. Such a “Competitive Advantage” is supported by the increasing
demand for certified systems in sensitive markets that, for instance, impose high
security and privacy requirements.
In addition, the findings highlight that online vendors try to “Achieve Cost
Savings” and “Increase Consumer Satisfaction” by internalizing certifications. For
example, online vendors can increase consumer satisfaction by improving the us-
ability of the system interface or adjusting the guarantees provided by the system
(e.g., a money-back guarantee to give consumers a feeling of safety). Regarding
cost savings, the findings are double-edged. On the one hand, the reviewed liter-
ature stresses cost savings stemming from the potential to increase the efficiency
of internal processes and to reduce quality deficiency costs by internalizing best
practices and standards (e.g., ISO 9001 quality management; Llopis & José Tarí,
2003; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). On the other hand, a major demoti-
vating factor that hampers the internalization of IS certifications is “Expenditure.”
Functionalists perceive high efforts and resulting expenditures that are involved in
the implementation of routines and procedures: “From my personal experience, it
can be said that certifications are often accompanied by major software changes”
[certification authority]. In particular, a certification requires an enormous effort in
documentation (Lins et al., 2018). Nevertheless, prevalent expenditures involved
in the internalization of certifications increase the inimitability of the certification
and internalization process and thus enable performance improvements and a com-
petitive advantage in the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Institutionalists
Adopters are considered institutionalists when they adopt IS certifications to con-
form to institutional pressures and seek to achieve legitimacy, which is the accep-
tance of the organization by its environment (Mignerat & Rivard, 2009), thereby
ensuring their long-term survival. The environment is defined as organizations
that constitute a recognized area of institutional life, including key suppliers, con-
sumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services
or products (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It is a foundational assumption of insti-
tutional theory that demands manifest as “coercive,” “mimetic,” and “normative
pressures” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Consequently, institutionalists adopt cer-
tifications to satisfy these pressures and ensure legitimacy (Table 5).
Satisfy coercive pressures
Institutionalists pursue certifications in response to the coercive pressures posed by
other parties to which their businesses are largely dependent on and that are power-
ful enough to directly reward compliance or sanction noncompliance (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983). In line with prior IS research (cf. Mignerat & Rivard, 2009),
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Table 5: Objectives of institutionalists and related motivators and demotivators.



















































our findings show that coercive pressures most notably originate from consumers,
suppliers, and governments. The literature and panelists view certifications as a
means to satisfy regulatory requirements and demonstrate an organization’s com-
pliance with “Regulatory Pressures” (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Djofack
& Camacho, 2017): “As part of [our service], we as the provider are obliged to
undergo a specified certification procedure every two years” [online vendor]. For
example, organizations may adopt the ISO 14001 certification to be in compliance
with environmental regulations (Quazi et al., 2001) or data protection certifications
to prove GDPR compliance. Organizations typically strive for regulatory compli-
ance to prevent legal sanctions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Moreover, “Supplier”
or “Consumer Pressure” may push online vendors to adopt IS certifications (Llopis
& José Tarí, 2003). Adopting certifications and thereby showing compliance with
suppliers and consumer pressures enables market access or expansion in inter-
national or domestic markets (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Kammoun &
Aouni, 2013): “Especially in B2B businesses, there are also consumers who only
make contracts with vendors who are certified” [certification authority].
In contrast, panelists report negative “Side Effects” when satisfying coercive
pressures: “It happens that the consumers misuse the certification and the assess-
ments to put pressure on the vendor” [online vendor]. For example, while some IS
certifications attach consumer reviews to the certification seal (e.g., the European
TrustedShops certification), online vendors fear negative consumer responses that
counteract the effects of certifications.
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Satisfy mimetic pressure
Mimetic pressure is defined as the pressure that results from uncertainties regard-
ing specific problem solving, the performance of specific activities or the achieve-
ment of distinct goals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional theory argues that
such uncertainties are powerful forces that encourage imitation: organizations may
model themselves on other organizations to enhance their legitimacy and demon-
strate their performance compared to their peers. Research shows that suchmimetic
pressure typically stems from competitors and peers (Mignerat & Rivard, 2009).
Both prior research and the panelists highlight that vendors perceive “Pressure
from Competitors” to adopt certifications (Quazi et al., 2001; Sampaio et al., 2010;
Prajogo, 2011). In particular, IS certifications are regarded as a common practice
and a “must-have” to ensure survival: “Other providers already have seals, they
belong to the state of the art” [certification authority]. With an increasing number
of organizations becoming certified, the certification process is only valued as an
“entry ticket” to compete and does not, on its own, lead to competitive success
(Nair & Prajogo, 2009). In this situation, the value of the certification as a differ-
entiator diminishes: “a quality label is a hygiene factor, the absence of which is
regarded as a deficiency but the presence of which is not an advantage” [online
vendor]. Instead, institutionalists try to “Increase Comparability” in the environ-
ment when satisfying mimetic pressure by certification adoption and thus achieve
legitimacy: “Consumers can recognize seals and compare them with similar of-
fers” [certification authority].
Satisfy normative pressures
A third source that impacts online vendors’ decision to adopt IS certifications refers
to normative pressures that stem from norms specified by institutions such as pro-
fessional or industry associations (Mignerat & Rivard, 2009). Normative pressure
differs from coercive pressure insofar as institutions that exert normative pres-
sure have no authority to directly enforce compliance and sanction noncompliance
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Our literature review confirms that online vendors are
driven by “Pressure from the Public,” such as the rules defined by local commu-
nities (Zutshi & Sohal, 2004), or “Pressure from Industry Associations” to ensure
compliance with industry expectations (Prajogo, 2011). Further, institutional the-
ory stresses that norms also result from education and professional networks that
span organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, to the extent that
managers and employees are drawn from the same universities, they will tend to
view problems similarly and to see the same policies and procedures normatively
sanctioned and legitimated. To ensure compliance with employees’ normative val-
ues or practices prevalent in the general business environment, employees may
exert pressure on their employing organization, which is referred to as “Internal
Normative Pressure” (Khalifa & Davison, 2006). Our literature review reveals in-
consistent views on internal pressure that results from employees and managers.
On the one hand, online vendors may adopt certifications because the adoption de-
cision is rooted in the inner conviction of the employees or top management. For
example, employees may enforce pressure to help the environment and engage in
eco-friendly behavior by internalizing an environmental management system, such
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as ISO 14001 (Zutshi & Sohal, 2004), or foster a quality culture within an orga-
nization through implementation of ISO 9001 (Nair, & Prajogo, 2009). Likewise,
certification adoption may be a genuine concern of top management to foster the
company’s strategy (Quazi et al., 2001).
On the other hand, “Resistance from Employees” might also emerge and
hamper adoption (Zutshi & Sohal, 2004). Resistance typically arises from inade-
quate training and support or employees’ unwillingness to change their operating
procedures. Additionally, panelists mentioned that “Limited Management Com-
mitment” slows adoption. Particularly in cases where managers decide to focus on
other short-term (e.g., seasonal business) or long-term goals (e.g., a new software
system to be installed), IS certifications will probably not be adopted due to an al-
most exhausted budget. One reason for such a negative stance of the organization
is a “Lack of Experience and Knowledge in Getting Certified.” While some online
vendors underestimate the efforts and resources required throughout the certifi-
cation process (Llopis & José Tarí, 2003), other online vendors overestimate the
amount of effort involved, particularly in meeting the certification requirements.
Both under- and overestimation may result from limited knowledge about IS cer-
tifications and hamper certification adoption.
Signalers
Adopters are considered to be signalers when they adopt IS certifications to com-
municate information regarding their unobservable characteristics and actions. IS
certifications are regarded as signals that consumers may find useful to consider
when, for example, making a purchase decision. In general, signals must be costly
(i.e., requiring significant time or effort to fake) to reliably separate reputable ven-
dors from imposters, which is a central component of signaling theory referred
to as the separating equilibrium (Spence, 1973). Under such circumstances, high-
quality vendors receive benefits from sending signals, and low-quality vendors re-
ceive benefits from not sending signals (Connelly, Certo, Ireland,&Reutzel, 2011).
Prior research has shown that certifications can act as reliable signals and create a
separating equilibrium (Terlaak&King, 2006; Lansing et al., 2019). Consequently,
if a vendor already has high-quality attributes, it is useful to adopt IS certifications
to “convey hidden information and actions” or “use them as a marketing tool,”
thereby “encouraging consumers to interact” with the vendor (Table 6).
Convey hidden information and hidden actions
According to the certification and signaling literature, signalers employ certifica-
tions to reduce information asymmetries between the vendor and the consumer
(Terlaak & King, 2006). Our findings confirm these assumptions, as vendors try
to “Increase the Transparency” of their systems, order and payment processes,
and products and services because certifications expose information about various
characteristics of the vendor that consumers might value, hence providing an
advantage over other vendors: “processes […] are transparent and easier to
follow” [online vendor]. In particular, signals can bridge informational problems
by making otherwise hidden information and hidden actions observable (Spence,
1973; Connelly et al., 2011). While hidden information is outlined as a situation
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Table 6: Objectives of signalers and related motivators and demotivators.
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in which a vendor has more information available regarding an imminent decision
by the consumer, a hidden action is defined as the state in which a vendor chooses
an unobservable level of effort, from the consumer’s view, regarding the product
and services offered. Our findings show that signalers adopt certifications to
render hidden information and to overcome hidden actions. First, vendors aspire
to “Signal Integrity”: “By using a seal, we want to be reputable toward our
consumers” [online vendor]. Certifications ensure a low level of fraud potential
and recovery of consumers’ compromised assets in case something unexpected
happens, which, in turn, lowers consumers’ risk perception. Second, online ven-
dors adopt IS certifications to “Signal Data Protection” by highlighting that they
collect, process, and handle data confidentially as well as follow data protection
regulations. The reason behind the adoption of these certifications is that “online
vendors work with highly sensitive consumer data and thus have to show their
consumers that they process data with great care” [online vendor]. Finally, ven-
dors adopt certifications to “Signal Buyer Protection,” referring to secure shopping
and payment processes: “The seal is designed to give website visitors a secure
shopping experience” [certification authority]. Through reducing information
asymmetries with IS certifications, vendors aim to “Increase Consumers’ Trust”
in the system and the vendor: “when we sought certification, there were many
skeptical consumers, who had problems to provide their credit card details. By
using well-known certifications, we initiated countermeasures” [online vendor].
However, certification authority experts also raised concerns that signalers
are hesitant to adopt in cases in which online vendors identify that there are “No
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Suitable Certifications” that help to resolve information problems: “With the mul-
titude of so-called labels, seals, certification symbols, it is difficult to find the right
supplier” [certification authority]. Likewise, online vendors’ imperceptible qual-
ities might go beyond what is communicated by the signal because certifications
“Only Attest to Minimum Standards” and typically do not consider online ven-
dors’ specific circumstances: “Auditors do not address the unique characteristics
and related benefits of the system itself but rather check generic certification re-
quirements” [certification authority]. In such situations, signaling theory assumes
that the signals may not correlate with an unobservable quality, referred to as a low
signaling fit (Connelly et al., 2011), ultimately impeding adoption.
Use certifications as a marketing tool
In addition to conveying information to reduce information asymmetries, online
vendors adopt IS certifications because they can be used as “Marketing Tools”
(Llopis & José Tarí, 2003; Sampaio et al., 2010). Online vendors can exploit a cer-
tification’s popularity to improve their organization’s public image. Certifications
can thus be part of a larger marketing strategy. The reason behind this is that “the
public image of a certified company is always better” [online vendor]. The sig-
naling theory literature supports this assumption by arguing that the credibility of
the endorser (i.e., the certification authority) will subsequently transfer to the sig-
naler (Aiken, Liu, Mackoy, & Osland, 2004). In addition, adopting certifications
may help online vendors to “Achieve a Better Web Search Ranking,” as presumed
by one online vendor: “appearance at the top of a Google search” [online ven-
dor]. While the specific search algorithms are opaque and constantly evolving,
the online community dealing with search engine optimization remains uncertain
whether embedding independent reviews and seals impacts search results.
The certification authorities further noted two threats for using certifications
as effective marketing tools, leading signalers to hold back. First, a “Certification’s
Lack of Credibility” resulting from the poor reputation of, or consumer’s limited
familiarity with, the certification and respective authorities: “Does ‘EVERY’ po-
tential consumer know the seal, certificate, or provider of the certification? […]
Unknown seals offer no added value” [certification authority]. Second, a “Certi-
fication’s Lack of Reliability” can result from the certificate authorities’ inability
to maintain its assurances in the long run. The panelists explained that existing
certifications represent only a retrospective view of the fulfillment of technical and
organizational measures when the certifications are issued. Typically, certification
authorities evaluate an online vendor’s adherence to a certification’s criteria during
a comprehensive attestation, which is performed once. Throughout the validity pe-
riod of one to three years, certification deviations or breaches may not be detected
until long after their occurrences because certification authorities validate certifica-
tion adherence via spot checks only during annual surveillance attestations (Lins
et al., 2019). “Certifications are snapshots, such as a technical inspection for a
car […] Everything was fine at the time of the attestation. However, as soon as
you leave the test site, safety is over” [online vendor]. This phenomenon is also
referred to as signal erosion in signaling theory, as the degree to which the cor-
relation between the signal and the quality in question declines over time, hence
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reducing the effectiveness of the signal (Connelly et al., 2011). Finally, if an on-
line vendor already possesses a “Strong Brand” and good reputation in the market
(e.g., Amazon), certifications as marketing tools are not necessary (Özpolat et al.,
2013): “Organizations with their strong brand do not need or want any external
trademarks shown on their websites” [certification authority].
Encourage consumers to interact with an online vendor
In line with signaling theory, for an IS certification signal to be effective, the online
vendor as a signaler benefits from some consumer action (i.e., using the system)
that the consumer would not have made without perceiving the signal (Connelly
et al., 2011). Signalers consider IS certifications to be an opportunity to “Acquire
More Consumers” when embedding a Web assurance seal (i.e., the graphical rep-
resentation of IS certifications) on their websites and system interfaces. Online
vendors hope that the presentation of such seals persuades consumers to buy from
them because the seals show that the online vendors are audited by a certification
authority and are therefore trustworthy. As one vendor stated, “With the seal, we
hope to convince consumers to buy from us.” In this way, the participants also indi-
cated that they expect an “Increase in Sales and Profits” following a certification’s
adoption.
In contrast, our findings reveal that online vendors also face several chal-
lenges during the early process of decision-making (i.e., when deciding which IS
certification and certification authority to choose) that inhibit online vendors from
adopting IS certifications. First, organizations are unsure whether and how they
can benefit from certifications, or they claim that there is not enough benefit to
becoming certified (Llopis & José Tarí, 2003). “Certifications’ intended effects
are not known in advance and cannot be easily measured” [certification author-
ity]. As a result, online vendors often decide to use their limited resources (e.g.,
financial and human resources) for other opportunities that are more promising
ways to increase sales compared with adopting IS certifications. We refer to this
demotivator as “Not Perceiving Benefits.” Furthermore, online vendors face a
trade-off between achieving benefits, such as a possible increase in sales, and the
costs that are associated with IS certifications: “The cost-benefit ratio is not right”
[online vendor]. Therefore, high “Signaling Costs” that result from the adoption
(i.e., certification fees) and implementation of certifications (i.e., staff training
and hiring of consultants) impede online vendors from adopting certifications.
Signaling theory strongly emphasizes that signaling costs are required to ensure
the effectiveness of an IS certification because it enables the differentiation of
high- and low-quality vendors (i.e., creation of a separating equilibrium; Spence,
1973). Nevertheless, it is important to note that when the costs are too high, the
signal will fail to differentiate organizations in the market, and all organizations
will choose not to certify (Terlaak & King, 2006).
Second, some online vendors do not seek further IS certifications because
they are “Already Certified” and thus see no benefit in showing additional web as-
surance seals on their websites. This demotivator, however, stands against findings
in the signaling theory literature stating that using complementary signals might
produce incremental improvements in consumers’ perception because coexisting
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signals act as reinforcements (e.g., Yen, 2006). Recent research on adopting mul-
tiple certifications provides the initial reasoning by showing that adopting more
IS certifications does not necessarily benefit an organization because the benefits
of additional certifications depend on “who” is certifying and what is certified (cf.
Lanahan & Armanios, 2018). A follow-on certification from a different certifi-
cation authority may reveal additional information, thereby reducing information
asymmetries, and bolster the external perception of the vendor’s potential value.
Conversely, more certifications from the same authority may not reveal additional
information and thus may harm the organization.
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MOTIVATORS AND
DEMOTIVATORS
The findings from the selection and ranking phases also provide insights into which
certification adopter type is most prevalent in the context of electronic markets
(Table 7).
Motivators related to the signaler and functionalist types were most often
selected and highly ranked, whereas no motivator of the institutionalist type was
selected by >45% of the panelists. The online vendor panel perceives “Increasing
Consumers’ Trust” (mean rank = 1.33), “Signal Integrity” (2.83), and “Increasing
Consumer Satisfaction” (3.33) as the most important motivators as well as “Use
as a Marketing Tool” (6.67), “Signal Data Protection” (7.83), and “Increasing IT
Security” (8.67) as the least important motivators. For the certification authority
panel, “Increasing Consumers’ Trust” (1.20), “Acquiring Consumers” (2.60), and
“Signal Integrity” (3.00) are the most important motivators, whereas “Increasing
Consumer Satisfaction” (6.00) and “Achieving Competitive Advantages” (7.00)
are the least important motivators.
Regarding the demotivators, signalers and functionalists are also most of-
ten selected and highly ranked. Nevertheless, three demotivators assigned to the
institutionalist type were perceived as highly important. From an online vendor
perspective, the most important demotivators are “Costs” (2.67), “Expenditures”
(3.00), and “Not Perceiving Benefits” (4.17). “Restricted Flexibility” (6.67), “Cer-
tification’s Lack of Credibility” (7.50), and “Fear of Failure” (7.50) are the least im-
portant demotivators. For the certification authority panel, “Expenditures” (2.20)
and “Costs” (2.20) are the two most important demotivators, and “Limited Man-
ager Commitment” (8.60) and “Certification’s Lack of Credibility” (8.60) are least
important.
DISCUSSION
Comparing the Results of the Literature Review and the Delphi Study
While we identified motivators and demotivators that were present in both the lit-
erature review and Delphi study, we provide a first indication that there is a set of
motivators and demotivators impacting organizations’ intentions when deciding to
adopt a certification that are independent of the actual contexts, such as electronic
markets or an environmental certification. For example, the motivators “Increase in
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Table 7: Results of the selection and ranking phase, showing motivators and de-
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Table 7: Continued.
























40% 47% - 7.00 - 8.60 - 10
FUNC Fear of failure 47% 37% 7.36 - 7.50 - 10 -
Kendall’s Coefficient W: 0.201 0.260 0.327 0.574
V, online vendor panel; CA, certification authority panel; FUNC, functionalists; INST, in-
stitutionalists; SIG, signalers.
Sales and Profit,” “Quality and Productivity Improvements,” and “Achieve Com-
petitive Advantages,” as well as the demotivators “Expenditures” and “Costs,”
seem to be independent of the context because these were often listed and dis-
cussed in the literature and our Delphi study. However, the findings of our study
reveal differences in motives as well. In particular, we found motivators and demo-
tivators that were not present in the prior literature and are specific for electronic
markets, including “Signal Data Protection” and “Ensuring Legal Conformity.”
These differences mainly relate to the actual content of the certification (i.e., what
is certified), such as security and privacy requirements for systems. Furthermore,
motivators and demotivators assigned to the institutionalist type are more strongly
derived from related literature on the certification of management standards (i.e.,
ISO 9001 and 14001), including “Pressures from Public or Industry Associations”
and “Internal Normative Pressures.” In contrast, our findings reveal that the sig-
naler and functionalist types are more prevalent in electronic markets compared to
the institutionalist type. Consequently, our findings also support our assumption
that motives in electronic markets differ from those in related disciplines.
Comparing the Online Vendor and the Certification Authority Panel
All of the motivators were identified by both panels except the motivator “Increase
in Comparability,” which was solely identified in the certification authority panel.
This agreement indicates a consensus among practitioners and shows that certifica-
tion authorities know vendors’ reasons for adopting IS certifications. Regarding the
demotivators, online vendors only raised five demotivators compared with the cer-
tification authorities, who discussed 15 demotivators. While this imbalance might
result from the composition of our online vendor panel, in which all online vendors
are certified, using experts of certification authorities as a second panel in our study
helped us to obtain a better understanding of potential demotivators. It should also
be noted that the literature review yielded considerably more motivators than de-
motivators. This finding not only supports our assumption that previous research
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has more frequently examinedmotivators than demotivators but also strongly high-
lights the value of soliciting the knowledge of certification authorities to identify
demotivators, which has been neglected in prior research when studying certifica-
tion adoption.
Concerning the selections and rankings, online vendors tend to select moti-
vators assigned to the signaler type more than the functionalist type of motivators.
In contrast, certification authorities’ selections are more dispersed across the sig-
naler and functionalist types. On the one hand, both panels similarly rated several
motivators and demotivators, such as “Increasing Consumers’ Trust,” “Acquiring
Consumers,” “Costs,” and “Expenditures.” On the other hand, it is interesting to
note that there are differences in their perceptions. For example, the demotivator
“Side Effects” was ranked higher by the online vendors (rank 4) than the certifi-
cation authorities (rank 9), providing insights that some motives may have been
underestimated by certification authorities and require future work on establishing
countermeasures.
Comparing Types of Certification Adopters
Clustering our findings in light of the three competing theoretical perspectives
reveals that motivators and demotivators are interdependent and can be assigned
in favor of certain adopter types, ultimately helping us to build up a typology of
certification adopters. Whereas “signalers” already possess high-quality attributes
and use IS certifications as a means to reduce information asymmetries, “function-
alists,” in contrast, may lack the quality attributes or are striving for continuous
improvement and therefore will thoroughly internalize best practices contained
in certifications. Such internalization will then enable functionalists to achieve
(long-term) advantages, such as increased consumer satisfaction and competitive
advantages, compared with signalers, who rely on the certification reputation in
the market to achieve benefits, such as increased sales. “Institutionalists” also lack
the required qualities but are solely seeking legitimacy through the adoption of
IS certifications. In contrast to functionalists, institutionalists adopt a minimalist
approach in implementing best practices and simply meet the requirements at the
minimum level, often taking a shortcut approach in adopting the certification (Nair
& Prajogo, 2009). In his study, Boiral (2003, p. 732) found that organizations
adopting the ISO 9001 standards from an institutionalist perspective “integrated
their quality system superficially so that the organization could pass the certifica-
tion audit without posing serious questions that were seen to be unnecessary and
undesirable.” Hence, the motivation for seeking legitimacy can easily overshadow
the purpose of building strategic organizational resources, such that organizations
may not be able to fully benefit from the adoption of certifications (Beck &
Walgenbach, 2005; Prajogo, 2011).
Despite these findings, it should be noted that the typology presented in
this paper is analytical: the types are not always empirically distinct or mutually
exclusive. The types, however, are able to describe the extremes of motives. The
adopter types also share basic motives, such as “Costs” for certifications or “Lim-
ited Management Commitment,” which may commonly surface in the decision
process about whether to adopt certifications. For example, “Costs” are assigned
26 Why Don’t You Join In?
to signalers but might also be considered by institutionalists. However, given
mimetic pressure, institutionalists may inevitably have to accept the associated
costs and adopt certifications, whereas signalers might choose another marketing
strategy promising a better cost-benefit ratio. Likewise, the type might change
over time; for instance, online vendors might follow a functionalist’s approach and
internalize the best practices contained in the certification first and then use the
acquired IS certifications to signal the improved quality and performance gained
through internalization, following a signaler’s approach in the long run.
Implications for Research and Practice
With our study, we contribute to the research on IS certification taking a vendor per-
spective and investigating related research streams, as summarized in Table 8. First,
we study the motives for IS certification adoption in electronic markets, which is
an essential context in everyday life, whereas much of the existing work in certifi-
cation pertains to the certification of management standards, such as ISO 9001 and
ISO 14001 (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). By synthesizing the existing lit-
erature and conducting a Delphi study, we not only validated 16 motives discussed
in prior research but also identified 21 novel motives that have not been discussed
before. However, we also reveal that certain motives are context-independent (e.g.,
“Increase in Sales and Profit,” “Quality and Productivity Improvements”), whereas
other motives are specific for the electronic markets, such as “Signal Data Protec-
tion” and “Buyer Protection.”
Second, unlike prior research on certifications, which has addressed mainly
the motivating factors for adopting certifications (e.g., Quazi et al., 2001; Sampaio
et al., 2010; Djofack & Camacho, 2017), we study both motivators and demoti-
vators. In particular, we included certification authorities’ knowledge to provide
a differentiated view on potential demotivators that have been neglected by prior
research. Although this inclusion makes the empirical data gathering more chal-
lenging, it adds significantly to our understanding of the opposing factors of cer-
tification adoption. Considering demotivators also helped us understand the pecu-
liarities of adopter types and boundary conditions for adoption, namely, describing
the circumstances in which individual adopter types will struggle when adopting
IS certification, which is largely missing in related research.
Third, we provide a more nuanced analysis of certification adoption by incor-
porating different theoretical lenses (i.e., the resource-based view, institutional the-
ory, and signaling theory) than has been seen in the literature to date. The literature
has mainly differentiated between the external and internal benefits of certification
adoption guided by the resource-based view or institutional theory (e.g., Martínez-
Costa et al., 2008; Sampaio et al., 2010). Specifically, while these theories provide
strikingly different predictions for certification adoption, we explore these differ-
ences in greater detail compared to the previous literature by deriving a typology
of certification adopters with a rich discussion on motivators and opposing demo-
tivators. Our study is also a first step toward alleviating the inconclusive findings
regarding motives for certification adoption in the academic literature by assigning
certain motives to a particular adopter type. Surprisingly, only a few articles have
even considered signaling theory as a useful lens for studying certifications from
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a vendor perspective (e.g., Terlaak & King, 2006; Gopal & Gao, 2009), whereas
research taking a consumer perspective has long acknowledged the value of sig-
naling theory in explaining certification effectiveness (e.g., Özpolat et al., 2013;
Mavlanova et al., 2016). Thus, we further contribute to research by separating ex-
ternal motives into signalers and institutionalists, providing more sophisticated ex-
planations on certification adoption, as highlighted by the high ranking of signaler
motives in the electronic markets.
While we took a vendor perspective and identified three major certification
adopter types, our findings also inform related literature streams on IS certifica-
tions (Table 2). When comparing our findings against the backdrop of research
taking a consumer perspective, we confirm that vendors intend to achieve certi-
fication effects, namely, increasing consumers’ trust perceptions (e.g., K. Kim
& Kim, 2011), purchase intentions (e.g., Mousavizadeh, Kim & Chen, 2016),
and perceived assurance (e.g., Lowry et al., 2012). Increasing consumers’ trust
was rated as most important by the online vendors and certification authorities
(rank 1 certification authority and vendor panel), followed by the desire to acquire
additional consumers by increasing their purchase intentions (rank 2 certifica-
tion authority and rank 4 vendor panel). However, our findings emphasize that
trust takes a dual form in the context of certifications. First, consumers’ trust in
online vendors is increased because information asymmetries are reduced and
certifications confirm vendors’ integrity, competence, and benevolence. Second,
the mechanism of trust transfer takes place to increase consumers’ trust. As-
suming that a certification authority is trustworthy, its certification can establish
a cognitive association with a certified vendor, whereby a consumer’s trust in
a certification authority is transferred to a certified vendor (Doney, Cannon, &
Mullen, 1998). Although consumer-related studies on certification effectiveness
acknowledge the potential occurrence of trust transference (e.g., Hu et al., 2010;
Kim & Kim, 2011), existing studies have neglected to test whether and how
trust transference takes place in the context of certification. We thus recommend
future certification research to consider the duality of trust when analyzing the
effectiveness of certifications. This research also provides a more fine-grained
view of increasing consumers’ perceived assurance. Prior research has mostly
operationalized perceived assurance concerning reducing the security and privacy
concerns of consumers (Kim & Kim, 2011; Lowry et al., 2012). Our findings
confirm that vendors aim to increase IT security and legal compliance as well as
to signal data protection, thereby fostering consumers’ perceptions of assurance.
However, our findings highlight that vendors are also acquiring IS certifications to
increase transparency in general, to signal integrity and to increase consumer sat-
isfaction, among other reasons. Consequently, future research taking a consumer
perspective might examine more effects that can result from IS certifications.
We also inform certification research on developing and designing certifica-
tions and the underlying attestation processes (Table 2). Certification authorities
and related organizations developing a new certification should carefully consider
which adopter type they want to address. If certifications want to address the needs
of specific adopter types, such as certifications targeting functionalists, they should
focus on providing best practices and implementation guidance for organizations
to foster internalization. Other certifications may require thorough scrutiny to
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exclude certain adopter types. For example, research projects are developing new
data protection certifications to prove compliance with the GDPR (e.g., the cloud
data protection certification AUDITOR). However, if institutionalists internalize
the underlying data protection practices only superficially (cf. Boiral, 2003),
consumers’ sensitive data and data protection rights (e.g., right to be forgotten)
might be at risk. As a consequence, thorough certification attestation processes
are required to prevent such superficial internalization by institutionalists in the
case of data protection certifications.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
We are well aware that our study contains some limitations. First, the results of
our Delphi study are based on a limited number of subjects. Although the Delphi
methodology does not require the panel to be a representative sample in a statistical
sense, given the nature and size of our panels, one must be cautious in generalizing
our findings. Having said this, the sample is relatively diverse in terms of the pan-
elists’ backgrounds, ranging from managers to auditors, consultants, and lawyers,
but at the same time, it is homogenous given that all the organizations are located
in Germany. Future research should examine whether our findings are still valid in
other cultural contexts. A second limitation relates to the low level of consensus
among the experts in the online vendor panel after round two of the Delphi ranking
phase for the demotivators. This level of consensus may reflect the various IS cer-
tifications that our panelists probably had in mind and the diverse organizational
settings that each panelist represented. While another round of ranking might have
resulted in a greater level of consensus, we felt that a non-negligible degree of panel
fatigue had set in. Rather than risking further drop-offs in participation, we decided
to stop at this point having already reached a reasonable degree of confidence in the
rankings, except for the demotivators in the online vendor panel (Schmidt, 1997).
Future research may therefore apply quantitative research methods to validate our
qualitative findings. Finally, further research is required to examine how to prevent
institutionalists’ minimalist approach in adopting certifications to prevent adverse
consequences, such as faked quality.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Financial support for this work by the German Research Foundation (dt. Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft; DFG) through the granted research project “Unblack-
boxing IT Certifications: A Decompositional Analysis of IT Certifications in Elec-
tronic Markets and their Impact on Customer and Platform Provider Perceptions”
(BE 4308/4-1 and SU-717/10-1) is gratefully acknowledged.
Open access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Infor-
mation section at the end of the article.
Supporting Information
30 Why Don’t You Join In?
REFERENCES
Aiken, K. D., Liu, B. S., Mackoy, R. D., & Osland, G. E. (2004). Building internet
trust. International Journal of InternetMarketing and Advertising, 1(3), 251–
267.
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 99–120.
Beck, N., & Walgenbach, P. (2005). Technical efficiency or adaptation to institu-
tionalized expectations? Organization Studies, 26(6), 841–866.
Boiral, O. (2003). ISO 9000: Outside the iron cage. Organization Science, 14(6),
720–737.
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling
theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39–67.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited. American Soci-
ological Review, 48(2), 147–160.
Djofack, S., & Camacho, M. A. R. (2017). Implementation of ISO 9001 in the
Spanish tourism industry. International Journal of Quality & Reliability
Management, 34(1), 18–37.
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence
of national culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management
Review, 23(3), 601–620.
Friedman, M. (1937). The use of ranks to avoid the assumption of normality im-
plicit in the analysis of variance. Journal of the American Statistical Associ-
ation, 32(200), 675–701.
Gopal, A., & Gao, G. (2009). Certification in the indian offshore IT services in-
dustry. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 11(3), 471–492.
Grant, R. M. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: Im-
plications for strategy formulation. California Management Review, 33(3),
114–135.
Heras-Saizarbitoria, I., & Boiral, O. (2013). ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. Interna-
tional Journal of Management Reviews, 15(1), 47–65.
Hu, X., Wu, G., Wu, Y., & Zhang, H. (2010). The effects of web assurance seals
on consumers’ initial trust in an online vendor. Decision Support Systems,
48(2), 407–418.
Kammoun, R., & Aouni, B. (2013). ISO 9000 adoption in Tunisia: Experiences
of certified companies. Total Quality Management & Business Excellence,
24(3-4), 259–274.
Khalifa, M., & Davison, M. (2006). SME adoption of IT: The case of electronic
trading systems. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 53(2),
275–284.
Kim, D. J., Steinfield, C., & Lai, Y.-J. (2008). Revisiting the role of web assur-
ance seals in business-to-consumer electronic commerce. Decision Support
Systems, 44(4), 1000–1015.
Lins et al. 31
Kim, D. J., Yim, M.-S., Sugumaran, V., & Rao, H. R. (2016). Web assurance seal
services, trust and consumers’ concerns. European Journal of Information
Systems, 25(3), 252–273.
Kim, K., & Kim, J. (2011). Third-party privacy certification as an online advertis-
ing strategy. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 25(3), 145–158.
Knight, G. A., & Liesch, P. W. (2002). Information internalisation in internation-
alising the firm. Journal of Business Research, 55(12), 981–995.
Lacity, M. C., Khan, S. A., &Willcocks, L. P. (2009). A review of the IT outsourc-
ing literature: Insights for practice. The Journal of Strategic Information Sys-
tems, 18(3), 130–146.
Lanahan, L., & Armanios, D. (2018). Does more certification always benefit a
venture? Organization Science, 29(5), 931–947.
Lansing, J., Benlian, A., & Sunyaev, A. (2018). ‘Unblackboxing’ decision mak-
ers’ interpretations of IS certifications in the context of cloud service certi-
fications. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 19(11), 1064–
1096.
Lansing, J., Siegfried, N., Sunyaev, A., & Benlian, A. (2019). Strategic signal-
ing through cloud service certifications. The Journal of Strategic Information
Systems, 28(4), 1–23.
Lins, S., Schneider, S., & Sunyaev, A. (2018). Trust is good, control is better:
Creating secure clouds by continuous auditing. IEEE Transactions on Cloud
Computing, 6(3), 890–903.
Lins, S., Schneider, S., Szefer, J., Ibraheem, S., & Ali, A. (2019). Designing moni-
toring systems for continuous certification of cloud services. CAIS, 44, 406–
510.
Llopis, J., & José Tarí, J. (2003). The importance of internal aspects in quality
improvement. International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management,
20(3), 304–324.
Löbbers, J., & Benlian, A. (2019). The effectiveness of IS certification in e-
commerce: Does personality matter? Journal of Decision Systems, 28(3),
233–259.
Löbbers, J., Lins, S., Kromat, T., Benlian, A., & Sunyaev, A. (2020). A multi-
perspective lens on web assurance seals. Electronic Commerce Research, 1–
43, forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-020-09415-2.
Lowry, P. B., Moody, G., Vance, A., Jensen, M., Jenkins, J., & Wells, T. (2012).
Using an elaboration likelihood approach to better understand the persuasive-
ness of website privacy assurance cues for online consumers. Journal of the
American Society for Information Science and Technology, 63(4), 755–776.
Lynn, T., van der Werff, L., Hunt, G., & Healy, P. (2016). Development of a cloud
trust label: A Delphi approach. Journal of Computer Information Systems,
56(3), 185–193.
Marimon, F., & Casadesús, M. (2017). Reasons to adopt ISO 50001 energy man-
agement system. Sustainability, 9(10), 1740–1755.
32 Why Don’t You Join In?
Martínez-Costa, M., Martínez-Lorente, A. R., & Choi, T. Y. (2008). Simultane-
ous consideration of TQM and ISO 9000 on performance and motivation.
International Journal of Production Economics, 113(1), 23–39.
Mavlanova, T., Benbunan-Fich, R., & Lang, G. (2016). The role of external and
internal signals in e-commerce. Decision Support Systems, 87, 59–68.
Mignerat, M., & Rivard, S. (2009). Positioning the institutional perspective in in-
formation systems research. Journal of Information Technology, 24(4), 369–
391.
Mousavizadeh, M., Kim, D. J., & Chen, R. (2016). Effects of assurance mecha-
nisms and consumer concerns on online purchase decisions. Decision Sup-
port Systems, 92, 79–90.
Nair, A., & Prajogo, D. I. (2009). Internalisation of ISO 9000 standards. Interna-
tional Journal of Production Research, 47(16), 4545–4568.
Naveh, E., & Marcus, A. (2004). When does the ISO 9000 quality assurance stan-
dard lead to performance improvement? IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management, 51(3), 352–363.
Okoli, C., & Pawlowski, S. D. (2004). The delphi method as a research tool: An ex-
ample, design considerations and applications. Information & Management,
42(1), 15–29.
Özpolat, K., Gao, G., Jank, W., & Viswanathan, S. (2013). The value of third-party
assurance seals in online retailing. Information Systems Research, 24(4),
1100–1111.
Paré, G., Cameron, A.-F., Poba-Nzaou, P., & Templier, M. (2013). A systematic
assessment of rigor in information systems ranking-type delphi studies. In-
formation & Management, 50(5), 207–217.
Piccinini, E., Hanelt, A., Gregory, R., & Kolbe, L. (2015). Transforming indus-
trial business. Proceedings of the International Conference on Information
Systems. Fort Worth, USA.
Prajogo, D. I. (2011). The roles of firms’ motives in affecting the outcomes of ISO
9000 adoption. International Journal of Operations & Production Manage-
ment, 31(1), 78–100.
Quazi, H. A., Khoo, Y.-K., Tan, C.-M., & Wong, P.-S. (2001). Motivation for ISO
14000 certification: Development of a predictive model.Omega, 29(6), 525–
542.
Sampaio, P., Saraiva, P., &Guimarães Rodrigues, A. (2010). A classificationmodel
for prediction of certificationmotivations from the contents of ISO 9001 audit
reports. Total Quality Management & Business Excellence, 21(12), 1279–
1298.
Schmidt, R. C. (1997). Managing delphi surveys using nonparametric statistical
techniques. Decision Sciences, 28(3), 763–774.
Singh, R., Keil, M., & Kasi, V. (2009). Identifying and overcoming the challenges
of implementing a project management office. European Journal of Infor-
mation Systems, 18(5), 409–427.
Lins et al. 33
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
87(3), 355–375.
Sunyaev, A., & Schneider, S. (2013). Cloud services certification. Communica-
tions of the ACM, 56(2), 33–36.
Terlaak, A., & King, A. A. (2006). The effect of certification with the ISO 9000
quality management standard. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 60(4), 579–602.
Vom Brocke, J., Simons, A., Riemer, K., Niehaves, B., Plattfaut, R., & Cleven, A.
(2015). Standing on the shoulders of giants. CAIS, 37, 1–22.
Webster, J., & Watson, R. T. (2002). Analyzing the past to prepare for the future:
Writing a literature review. MIS Quarterly, 26(2), xiii–xxiii.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5(2), 171–180.
Yen, H. R. (2006). Risk-reducing signals for new online retailers. International
Journal of Internet Marketing and Advertising, 3(4), 299–317.
Zutshi, A., & Sohal, A. (2004). Environmental management system adoption by
Australasian organisations. Technovation, 24(4), 335–357.
Sebastian Lins is a PhD student at the Research Group Critical Information Infras-
tructures (cii), Institute of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Methods,
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany. His main interests in the field
of information systems research are the (continuous) certification of cloud services
and distributed ledger technology as well as understanding and enhancing the ef-
fectiveness of IS certifications. His work has been published in international jour-
nals such as IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, IEEE Security and Privacy,
andCommunications of the Association for Information Systems, as well as in con-
ference proceedings such as International Conference on Information Systems and
European Conference on Information Systems.
Theresa Kromat is a PhD student at the Research Group Critical Information In-
frastructures (cii), Institute of Applied Informatics and Formal Description Meth-
ods, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany. She received her B.A. in
economics and her MSc in business studies from the University of Kassel, Ger-
many. Her main research interest is in the area of IS certifications in e-commerce.
Julian Löbbers is a PhD student at TU Darmstadt, Germany. He holds a MSc
in information systems from the University of Münster, Germany. His research
interests are in the area of information asymmetries in online environments, digital
businessmodels aswell as businessmodel innovation. His work has been published
in the proceedings of the European Conference on Information Systems.
Alexander Benlian is a professor of MIS at TU Darmstadt, Germany, where he
currently serves as Dean of the Department of Business, Economics, and Law.
His former academic position was Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich,
where he received a PhD and worked as an assistant professor. He has also served
34 Why Don’t You Join In?
as a senior consultant with McKinsey & Company. His current research interests
include the transformative value of cloud computing, online platforms, digital
transformation, and digital business models, with over 150 academic publications
in these areas. His work has appeared in MISQ, JMIS, JAIS, JIT, JSIS, ISJ, EJIS,
EJOR, JSR, DSS, MIS Quarterly Executive, and several others. He is currently
Associate Editor of the European Journal of Information Systems and the Inter-
national Journal of Electronic Commerce and serves the Editorial Review Board
of the Journal of Service Research.
Ali Sunyaev is a professor for computer science at the Karlsruhe Institute of Tech-
nology (KIT), Germany. Before joining KIT, he was a professor at the University
of Kassel and the University of Cologne. He received his PhD in information sys-
tems from the Technical University ofMunich (TUM). His research work accounts
for the multifaceted use contexts of digital technologies with research on human
behavior affecting IT applications and vice versa. His research appeared in journals
including JIT, JMIS, JAIS, IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, Communica-
tions of the ACM, and others. His research work has been appreciated numerous
times and is featured in a variety of media outlets.
